

REASONS WHY THIS NATION

Ought to put a Speedy END to this
Expensive WAR;

With a Brief Essay, at the probable CON-
DITIONS on which the PEACE, now
Negotiating, may be Founded.

ALSO

An Enquiry into the Obligations BRITAIN
lies under to the ALLIES; and how
far She is obliged not to make PEACE
without them.

*Then Gideon built an Altar there unto the Lord, and
called it Jehovah Shalom, i. e. the Lord send
Peace. Judges VI. 24.*

*My Soul hath long dwelt with him that hateth Peace:
I am for Peace; but when I speak, they are for
War, Psalm CXX, 6, 7.*

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A MIND possess'd with any Tender-
ness for the Miseries, Sufferings
and Distresses of its Native Land,
that has the Happiness of any Ge-
nerous Principles, and shares something of
that sublime Quality, called by the Ancients,
Love of our Country, cannot look upon the
present Condition of this Nation without
being in the highest Degree affected. Our
Saviour's most affectionate View of the Ho-
ly City, express'd in that most emphatical
Text, *O Jerusalem, Jerusalem!* may be with
the greatest Justice and Propriety applied
to this Island. We seem to have *the Things
which belong unto our Peace* entirely hidden
from our Eyes. How have we above Twenty
Years groan'd under a Long and a Bloody
War? How often has our most remote
Views of Peace gladden'd our Souls, and

chear'd up our Spirits? Our Stocks have always risen or fallen, as the Prospects we had of that amiable Object were near or remote.

We have seldom seen any of our Publick Acts, whether of Parliament, or of Council, but they are Prefac'd with something or other relating to the War. The Word WAR is not express'd in them without the Adjunct of some Epithet; such as, Bloody War, Heavy War, Chargeable War, Dangerous War, &c. Our Politicians have promised themselves every Year, that the Enemy will be reduc'd, that the War cannot hold long, that surely this Year, and that Year, and the other Year, will be the last of the War. Thus have we kept up our Spirits with the Hopes of coming to the desir'd Port, viz. the Haven of Peace; and every Effort which the Nation has made for the raising Money to carry on this War, has been encourag'd both from Prince and People, with the putting us in Hopes, that all shall at last be crown'd with PEACE; that this, 'tis hoped, may be the last Year of the War. Thus once more, and once more, &c. and still we hoped the Work will be over; and in all this I do not see, that a Nation plung'd so deep, whose Weights and Pressures have been so many, can in any wise be reflected on; neither her Courage, her Patience, her Strength,

Strength, her Wealth, or any part of those Things whereof her Sons so boast in the Behalf of her their Mother, can be reproach'd. Who ever said of *Britain*, That she could never be weakned; That her Strength was invincible, her Wealth inexhaustible? That she could hold out the War for ever; That she would never languish for Peace, or need Respite from a Perpetual War? That she could never bleed to Death; And that her Body was invulnerable? These are Things no wise Man will pretend to; nor would such a Way of Arguing please the most Sanguine among us at this Time: At the Beginning of the War such Excursions might be born with, when our Youth first felt their own Strength, and our National Riches were so immense, that we perswaded our selves they had no Bottom. But *the Case is alter'd Now*. Now we see our Treasure lost, our Funds exhausted, all our publick Revenues Sold, Mortgaged, and Anticipated; vast and endless Interests entail'd upon our Posterity, the whole Kingdom sold to Usury, and an immense Treasure turn'd into an immense Debt to pay; we went out full, but are return'd empty. We find our Great Navy spread the Seas to the Expence of above Three Millions Yearly, which yet our Enemies regard so little, that they carry on the War as it were without a Navy, and think it
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not worth the Expence to fit out their Fleet to prevent us; but they gain from us every Year by their Privateering, as much as they would lose by fitting out their Navy.

In our Land Armies, we expend mighty Sums to perform trifling Exploits, and please our selves with a few Inches of the Enemy's Ground, bought too dear, and paid for with a double Price of Money and Blood. How do we flatter our selves in the War, and call it a Glorious Campaign! when we have taken a little Fort, Ten of which have scarce suffic'd our Enemy, the King of *France*, for the Triumphs of a Summer's Service.

When we look upon our victorious Army, and our Generals crown'd with Lawrels, and Garlands of Victory; how do those very Victories ruine us? And how many such Battles, as that near *Mons*, could we bear? There we conquer'd the *Mareschal de Villars*, and gain'd the Honour of the Field of Battle? But how lie the Bones of 22000 of the best and bravest Soldiers in Christendom sacrificed meerly to the Pique of Glory between the Haughty Generals, and to decide the mighty Contest between us and the *French*, who should possess the Hedges of *Tanniers*, or be Masters of the little Coppice of *Blareignes*. Where was the Necessity of this Trial of Skill at so great an Expence? What Enterprize was made easy by it? *Mons* was taken

taken afterwards, and *Mons* might have been taken before; the Enemy possess'd again the very same Spot of Ground in less than 10 Days, and bid you come on again at the same Price: Experience teaching us (*bloody Experience is War indeed!*) that this was not the Way, that such Victories would vanquish the Conquerour, that this was the only Way to ruine the Troops, and give the Enemy at length the Superiority. We fall next to besieging Towns, *Douay*, *Bethune*, *St. Venant*, and *Air*, finish another Glorious Campaign, as we call it, and 35000 of our boldest and forwardest Troops lie buried in the Ditches of those paltry Places: The Execution is so terrible, that it becomes the Aversion of the very Army it self. And whereas, at the Beginning of this present Campaign, it was given out that the General would begin the Operations, &c. with the Siege of *Ipres*, or of *St. Omer*, 10000 of your Men ran away, and deserted to the Enemy in a very few Weeks. This is confirm'd by, as it was the Occasion of that cruel Proclamation of the King of *Prussia*, appointing all that should desert, and be retaken, among his Troops, to have their Noses cut off, and be kept in perpetual Slavery at hard Work, with a Chain about their Necks: Notwithstanding this, we attack *Bouchain*, and with small Loss obtain that

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Conquest, having not above 6000 Men Kill'd and Wounded in that Glorious Conquest. His Grace the Duke of *Marlborough* resolving to make what Advantage he possibly could of the present Consternation of the *French*, makes Preparations for another Siege, which, as was given out, should be that of *Cambray*, or of *Valenciennes*, *Le Quesnoy*, or *Maubeuge*; but the Season being advanc'd, and the Siege of *Aire* being fresh in the Memory of our Men, the Apprehensions of another Autumn Siege has so intimidated our People, that the Desertion is as great as ever, among our Troops; so that our Advices from the Army tell us, the Resolutions of a Siege are laid by, and the Troops will be put into Quarters of Refreshment, and this Glorious Campaign, which has cost the Allies so many Millions, must end on that Side *avec le Prise de Bouchain*.

This brief Recapitulation of the State of the Affair in *Flanders* is thus laid down here, not in the least to lessen the Esteem we ought to have for our Generals and great Officers employ'd in this War, of whose Conduct and Bravery the World speaks such Glorious Things; no, this does not detract from their Characters, but rather confesses that they have done all that it was possible for Men to do. That notwithstanding

ing the Superiority of the Enemy, they have offered them Battle in the Field, have entred their Lines, which they gave out were Impenetrable; Attack'd and taken a Town in their View, after all their Efforts to prevent it; and after a Thousand Gasconades of Monsieur *Villars* to his Master, that it was impossible the Duke of *Marlborough* could Invest it: But this is not the Subject of the present Treatise, the Question before us is of another Kind: It is not to Enquire whether we are able to Fight and Conquer, able to push Monsieur *Villars* out of his Fastnesses, and take Towns with an Hundred Thousand Witnesses; but the main Hinge whereon all the Affair now turns, is this: What is this to ending the War? How long may the King of *France* keep us thus at Bay? How many Towns have we yet to take from him, before he can effectually be humbled and reduced to such Terms of Peace as we pretend to desire? Whether to resolve to carry on the War till *France* is reduc'd, after the Rate of one Town every Summer, will not eternize and entail the War to us and to our Heirs for ever, or to issue a few more such Glorious Campaigns in an inglorious Peace at last. It may be therefore a most needful Enquiry for the curious Heads of this Age to reflect back a little upon our own Circumstances, and enquire what Reasons

we have, which are drawn from within our selves, and turn upon the great Hinge of our own Affairs only, and which move, and press, and call upon us to put an End to this War upon the best Conditions we can.

Before we come to this Enquiry, it may be also very needful to suggest or premise, that by putting an End to the War, is not meant that we should sue to the King of *France* for Peace, and take such Conditions as he shall impose upon us, as if he was Conqueror, and we were subdued: But by putting an End to the War, is here to be understood, listening to a Treaty with a sincere Desire and Resolution; if the Enemy may be brought to make just, reasonable, and fair Proposals, to close with them, and not insist upon one Thing after another, and grow, and encroach in Demand from one Thing to another, till at last we come to insist upon Impossibilities, and make such Demands as, we know, the Enemy cannot grant; or which, if they should have granted, we knew they could not execute. It is not needful that we enter here into a Dissertation concerning the Reasonableness of our last Method of treating with the *French*; or whether it was sincere on either Side. On our Part we were daily told, the *French* Ministers hover'd about the Thing it self, kept at a Distance from the Substance of
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the Treaty, which was the Security of the Performance, and trifled with the Confederates. On the other Side, the *French* alledg'd, that the Confederates treated haughtily, as if they were with their Armies at the Gates of *Paris*; that they kept the *French* Commissioners like Prisoners in a Garrison, permitting them to speak with no Body but the *Dutch* Deputies, who came and went like meer Messengers of an Errand; that they were not allowed to see any of the Ministers of the other Allies, tho' they were concern'd in the War as well as they, as if the *Dutch* were afraid that their Proposals were so reasonable, the rest of the Allies should think them sufficient, and be inclin'd to close with them; That the *Dutch* acted by the Pensionary, and the Lord T----- in Concert with the D---- of M-----, and the *English* Court would never come to any Certainty what would content them; but daily declared every Thing unsatisfactory, till at last, being pressed to declare what they would have, they put the whole upon an Impossibility; as to the King of *France* obliging his Grandson to evacuate *Spain*; refusing the least Equivalent for peaceably giving up such vast Dominions above Eight Year in Possession, &c.

Many more Particulars might be objected hereagainst the Methods and Measures taken with the Enemy, in the last Treaty which was managed at *Gertruydenberg*: But this may suffice to include the whole, (*viz.*) that we treated them as if the King of *Spain* had been Prisoner of War, and the King of *France* fled from *Versailles*; or rather, as if a certain General had put them both into his Coach; and as if not only *Spain*, but *France* it self, had been lost: And that this may not pass for the Words of this Pamphlet only, it may not be amiss to note, that when the Marquiss *de Uxelles* complain'd of the ill Success of their Negotiation, and that they treated as if they had *France* in Possession; He was answer'd, that *He ought to reckon it his good Fortune, that he had the Honour to save the Kingdom of France upon such easy Terms.* Whether it was due to the Scituation of our Affairs at that Time, to push Matters to such a Height; the Process of another Campaign may better argue than any other kind of Demonstration, since another whole Summer is past over; another glorious Campaign in *Flanders* ended. The great, and so much boasted Impression the D. of *Savoy* was to make, is ended, and that Prince retired, and *France* is not yet won; No, not a Foot set in its Dominions, and but

but a very few Inches of Ground gain'd, which we have paid dear for, (*viz*) Many Thousands of our best Troops kill'd and wounded; many Millions of Treasures expended, and near *Twenty Thousand* of our Men run away and deserted to the Enemy; Nay, so great is the Desertion of the Soldiers for Fear of another Siege, that even at the Writing these Sheets, the publick printed News says, *The Desertion of the Infantry is great to Astonishment.* Vide the *Post-Boy*, No. 2552. September the 20th 1711.

These serve us for so many Convictions of the Imprudence of our late Conduct in treating with the *French*; which either proceeded from a misgrounded Elevation in the Allies, upon the Success of the former Campaigns, and strange Notions that the *French* were in no Condition to carry on the War, no not one Campaign more; or else from selfish Principles in some of the Persons concern'd, who for Reasons of their own, were unwilling the War should End, and would choose rather to sacrifice their Country, and the Interest of their Queen, than make Use of any Opportunity, how Advantageous soever, to make a Peace with the Enemy. It is not the Business of this Tract to enquire, which of these Principles were the fatal Overthrow of the Treaty; or what has
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prompted us to carry on the War for this last Year, when so good Conditions of Peace were then offered, and so little Gain by the War was in View.

But it is worthy our Notice here, and not improper to the Purpose, to observe, how very much we have all along deceiv'd our selves with Hopes from the Weakness of the *French*, having so blinded our Eyes with the Accounts of their bad Condition, that we have entirely overlook'd the Decay of our own. Every Autumn we have represented the broken Condition of their Troops; and thro' the whole Season for recruiting the Forces, we have been amused with fictitious Accounts of their Cavalry being in no Condition to take the Field, their Recruits for the Foot not being arrived; the Difficulty the Intendants of the Provinces found to raise Men; the Men when raised, being forced against their Wills, taking all Opportunities to desert; the Quality of the Recruits; their being most made up of Boys and Youths unfit for Service: Yet has it been always observed, that towards the marching of the Armies into the Field, the Scene have been changed, and we have Accounts, that their Cavalry make a fine Appearance; that their Infantry are new cloath'd; and every Year, to enhance the

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Value of every Advantage we gain over them, we forget not to own their Superiority in Number.

Seeing therefore that these Hopes have not yet appear'd well grounded, and that, notwithstanding all our Expectations, the Enemy lets us see, that he is still able to hold out, and that he dares to carry on the War, notwithstanding our Threats, and the Menaces of our Deputies. It seems that it is not now the Business of the Allies to amuse themselves with the Expectation of reducing him every Campaign, as we have done; the vain Fruit of which has supported the Nation so long.

It seems rather the Work of the considering Heads now employed, to rectify these Errors; and, if it be to be retrieved, make some Amends to the Nation of *Britain* for the past Mistake. *Peace is the Thing we want*; if it should be our Misfortune to have any Number of Men among us, who are of a differing Opinion, they are calmly entreated to consider some Heads; (1.) Of our own Circumstances; And (2.) of our Enemies: From both which, if impartially and without Prejudice search'd into, they may find Reason to yield up this Point, (*viz.*) that it is absolutely necessary to us to put an End to this War.

Nor has it been deny'd, even by the wisest and best Men concerned in the last Ministry, that we were in so much Necessity of Peace; the Error lay in this Part of it, (whether it was a Delusion or no, Time may discover) That they perswaded us, and perhaps themselves also, that the King of *France* was in a greater Exigence, and that Peace was more necessary to him than to the Allies. We shall consider the Circumstances of both, and perhaps the Inferences may decide the Controversies on both Sides at the same Time.

The Questions are very material, and admit of some Enlargement; but this may be received as the Abstract of the whole.

- I. What Occasion we have for Peace.
- II. What Condition the *French* are in to carry on the War.

The Occasion we have for Peace, it is too harsh to say, the Necessity we are in for it proceeds from,

- i. The great Loss and Hindrance the carrying on this War is to our Commerce; to the Exportation of our Manufactures and Home-growth; to the Employment of our Poor; and to the Consumption of the Produce of this Island in Foreign Parts. It is an unpleasant Work for any Writer to

expose the Weakness of his Country, and the Decay of Trade among our People.

But let any of our general Calculators in these Matters determine this Case: Let it be enquired, Whether the *Rates* of our Manufactures are held up to the former Price? Whether our Wool is consumed? Or whether there is Three Years Growth of Wool now in the Hands of the Farmers, and Graziers, and Sheep Masters, in this Island unfolded? Together with this they may enquire, Whether the Price of *English* Wool is not, by this great Interruption of our Trade, fallen near 40 l. *per Cent* in Value; and if this does not yet affect the Landed-Men, no doubt it must affect them in a little Time.

Discourses of Trade are not the particular Talent of the Author of this, and therefore farther Enlargement on this Head is avoided; but if it may be allowed to weigh any Thing in this Case, the Reader is desired to observe the Number of Shops and Houses now shut up, and to be Lett between *Cheapside* and *Charing-Cross*; which, as it has been observed, are now more than ever were known: And the like Proportion is, as we are credibly informed, in most of the Great and Trading Towns in *England*.

The Author has been told, That above 50 Shops are shut up, or to be lett, between *Ludgate* and *Temple-Bar*; That 10 Houses, which were formerly of considerable Whole-sale Trades-Men, are shut up about *Holbourn-Bridge*; and the Number of Bankrupts in every *Gazette*, is an Astonishment.

Come we in the next place to consider the Taxes and Anticipations, which are yearly paid, and lie as a dead Weight upon the Ages to come. That every Article of the Revenues is Mortgaged and Anticipated, and that, generally speaking, for an Hundred Years to come. It is unpleasant to enumerate the Funds lodg'd in the Offices of the Exchequer, for Payment of Annuities, Tickets, Exchequer Bills, and Tallies; they are too well known to make it needful in this Case. The Heads of the Projectors have been rack'd for new-invented Taxes, and the Number of those Taxes exceeds all that ever were practis'd in the late Rebellion. All Duties and Customs are stretch'd to the Extremity that they can bear, and beyond what it was believ'd in former Times could be practicable. Every necessary Import or Produce, our Corn and Cattle excepted, are taxed to the highest Pitch they are capable of; such as Coals, Salt, Malt, Leather, Candles, Beer, Ale, Cyder, Perry, Spirits, Vinegar, Glass-Windows,

dows, Hackney Coaches, Chairs, Apprentices Fees, Hops, and whatever can be thought capable of paying, or worth collecting: Duties and Customs on Importation are doubl'd and trebl'd to such a Degree, that it is hard to find out one Clause of Foreign Trade which is able to bear a heavier Tax than is already laid; not to mention some, which, by the Greatness of the Duty, are either not imported at all, or are run in by the Arts and Vigilance of clandestine Traders, the Greatness of the Duty encouraging them to run the Hazard.

By these Things the Nation appears so entirely exhausted of Means to raise more Money, that nothing remains but the Choice of Two ruinous Extrems, (*viz.*) The Taxing our Food and Cloaths, which is called a General Excise, and which is such a Burthen as the Nation ought not to be loaded with, if it be possible to avoid it; the Number and Condition of our Poor considered; and is a Thing which our Parliament, in all Ages, have avoided, and will avoid, till they are brought to the last Extremity; which Extremity is the Ground of the present Argument for a *PEACE* with *France*; Or (2.) putting a Stop to the Payment of the Interest of the Funds already charged and established.

From what has been said, the Truth of which may easily be proved, this single Question seems to be offer'd to the Consideration of the People of this Island: Whether ought we, on the one Hand, to lay a General Excise or Tax upon all Cloaths, Household Stuff, and Food; or stop the Payment of the Funds? Or, on the other Hand, put an End to the War?

If any Objector will put in his Protest against the Alternative, and alledge, that we are not brought to the Necessity of this Choice, he must, at the same Time, let us see what Door of Escape he has found out, and by what other Method he can propose to raise Money for carrying on the War: The Writer of these Sheets owns to have seen the Schemes of Taxes offer'd by most of the Projectors of this Town the last Year, and does think he may affirm, there is not one which contains not, either some Branches of a *General Excise*, as above, or something equivalent to it, and equally oppressive; so that the Nation either would not, or could not bear them; and he is the bolder therefore to say, there are no other Ways but the Two above-said. We will not say, the stopping the Payment of the Funds has been projected by either the present or past Ministry, tho' it has been reported of both; but especially was it thrown upon one, per-

perhaps to conceal its being the real Design of the other. But it is left to any unprejudic'd Judgment to consider, what would be the Effects of either of these Things to the Nation.

Nevertheless, one Use may not be improperly made of this, which, by Way of Remark, is laid here before the Reader for his Consideration ; *and it is this*, that the Weakness of a Topick much made Use of among a dissatisfied Party of Men among us, appears by it (*viz.*) That the Way to overthrow the present Ministry is, to plunge them in the Matter of Funds, ruine the publick Credit, and bring them to such Exigencies, that they cannot carry on the War ; that then the *Queen* must change her Ministry again ; and these People, not being able to support the Government, or carry on the War, Her Majesty must, of Necessity, have Recourse to those who are able to do both. The Weakness of which Argument, as is said, appears very conspicuous ; for that all the Difficulties the present Ministry are driven unto by the People, who thus endeavour to plunge them, are really no Difficulties at all, any other than as the Ministry are backward and unwilling to bring Hardships and severe Things upon the Country ; that they are loth to lay those heavy Taxes upon the People, which must necessarily follow, if they

they are obliged to raise the whole Money, necessary for the Service of every Year, in that Year wherein it is to be wanted ; or loth to put a Stop to the Payment of Interest, which falls Annually due upon the publick Funds for Money already borrowed, and which they know, would fall heavy upon innumerable Families, tho' it is not doubted, Ten Parts of Twelve of the Land-ed Men in *England*, would come into such a Proposal. If the Ministry would come in to either of these Proposals, *it is obvious*, they may carry on the War as long as they please, without being obliged any more to court those People for upholding the publick Credit, who make that Advantage a Plan for the Destruction of the Ministry : Either of the Two Articles aforesaid, (*viz.*) of General Excises, or stopping the Payment of the Funds, would be sufficient every Year for the Service of that respective Year. This one of their own Writers told them plainly enough ; for which, I hear him frequently curs'd among them, tho', it seems, the Man has more Penetration in those Matters, than most of them ; for nothing is more certain, than that the Endeavours of the *Whigs* to destroy the publick Credit, has exposed them more than any other of their Conduct ; as if they were a Party willing to ruine the Nation, rather than

than not keep the Reins in their own Hands; and as if they were resolv'd that the New Ministry should fall, tho' themselves were to fall with them. This, the aforesaid Writer, tho' of their own Party, very well indeed, and with pungent Reasons, warn'd them of, under the apposite Similie of sinking the Ship; but when Envy blinds Men's Eyes, they are render'd deaf to the Counsel of their Friends, much more are they so to that of their Enemies; for they cast Stones at the Advice, and, as I am inform'd, at the Adviser too.

And now their Mistake appears plain, and nothing exposes them more; for it is obvious to every Eye, that the Government have THREE Ways to avoid the Mischief; and that Snare which the Party thought could not fail, is Three Ways to be broken, and brought to Nought.

I. *By General Excises*, which will raise sufficient every Year for the whole Demand of the War for that Year.

II. *By Stop of the Funds*, which would cause the Customs, the Excise, the Duties on Salt, Leather, Coals, Candles, Hops, Windows, Stamp'd Paper, Post-Office, and all other appropriated Taxes, to be paid directly into
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the publick Treasury, for carrying on the War.

III. OR, if either of these were not thought fit to be done, then was it in the Power of the Government, according to Her Majesty's Prerogative, to put an End to the War ; which if it were not then so advantageously concluded as it ought to be, or as once it might have been ; yet the People might see who had compell'd them to it, and on whom all the Blame of it ought to be laid.

This leads us to the Enquiry, which, as appears by the Title, is the main End and Design of these Sheets, (*viz.*) What are the Reasons why we should put a speedy End to this War ? And though there are many more, yet some of them may be understood by these that follow.

1. Because it does not seem to be EASY for us to carry on the War, It is with Respect to the Two former Heads, (*viz.*) the General Excises, and the Stop of the Funds ; that the Word *Possible*, is not put here instead of the Word *Easy*.

2. Be-

It is confess'd as aforesaid, That the War might still be continued, if the Government would so far abandon all Concern for the Miseries and Disasters of the Poor, as to load them with the insupportable Taxes which are practis'd in Foreign Countries; and such as other Governments do tax their People with, such as Gabels upon Corn, as in *Italy* and *Switzerland*; Polls upon their Sheep and Black Cattle, as in *Prussia* and *Brandenburgh*, Tailles upon their Shops, and Trades, as in *France*, or general Excise upon their Eatables to the very Turneps, Carrets and Cabbage, as in *Holland*. Thus the War may be continued, tho' this is not any Objection against the Reason above; for this will not be called carrying it on *EASILY*, and therefore the Government finding the War cannot *EASILY* be continued, *i. e.* without Heavy, Insupportable and Oppressive Burthens on the People, and especially on the Poor. It must be acknowledged, That to a *Queen* fill'd with Compassion, and moved with the Pressures of her Subjects, who as a true Nursing Mother is affected with the Sufferings and Distresses of her People: This is a good Reason, why Her Majesty should be willing to put an End to this War.

2. Because by a Treaty of Peace, it is probable, the true Ends and Designs of this War, and for which it was at first undertaken, may be obtained.

The First Pretence of, and which for a long Time was the Introduction to all Publick Acts relating to this War, was, The Reducing the Exorbitant Power of *France*; by Degrees this Title to the War was dropt, perhaps by some that found the End obtain'd sooner than they desired it should be. And then, we had it chang'd for these Words; *For the Obtaining a Lasting, Safe, and Honourable Peace*: These Words were thought so extensive, that they might afford the Parties room to shift at, and constantly furnish them with Matter to object, and with Pretences to keep the Rupture on Foot, and to keep the Wound open, on Pretence that the Cure was not perfect, that the Peace was not Lasting and Safe.

But foreseeing afterwards, that the King of *France* really made such Offers, that contained all the Three Terms which the Peace was to have. (1) That it was *Honourable*, for that the King of *France* sought it, and yielded to many great Demands, such as fully confess'd his being over-match'd in the

the War. (2) That it was Safe, because the King of *France* restored such Strengths, and put into their Hands such Countries, as might for ever enable the Confederates to over-power him. And (3) That both these assisted to make it Durable and Lasting. Foreseeing this, I say, the People who still were unwilling to bring the War to a Period, chang'd the Title a Second Time, and call'd it a War for recovering the whole Monarchy of *Spain* --- Nay, when they come by a Treaty to see a Probability of obtaining this also. They chang'd their Demands a Third Time into ---- The Security for Evacuation, refusing the King of *France's* Offer of Money to be contributed for his Quota of the War, to compel his Grandson to evacuate *Spain*, if he should refuse it.

These Things have made it appear, that the true Ends of the War may be obtain'd by a Treaty of Peace, and that there has been some nameless Error in all former Treaties, which have rendered them abortive. It must be allow'd, by reasonable and indifferent People, That if Her Majesty can obtain by a Peace what this War was at first undertaken for, this join'd to the former, is a good Reason why a speedy End should be put to the War.

3. Because that tho' it were to be allow'd, that by continuing the War, some greater Advantage in the Terms of a Peace might be obtain'd ; yet that those Advantages do not seem adequate and proportioned to the Expence and Loss, the Effusion of Blood, the Expence of Treasure, and the Hardships suffered by the Nation in their Trade, and in their Taxes, which must be the necessary Consequences of continuing the War.

This relates to the Evacuation of *Spain*, and putting it into the Hands of the House of *Austria*, which, tho' necessary to be done in the View of Things at the Beginning of the War, seem not to be either so necessary, or indeed of that Consequence to the Allies, the Face of Affairs in *Europe* being now changed as they were before. First, With Respect to the Exorbitant Power of *France*, which is so Broken and Reduced by this long War, as that 'tis believed *France* has gotten a full Surfeit of the Ambitious Gust to Universal Monarchy, and is in no Condition to turn his Thought that Way, for

for a Hundred Years to come. And Secondly, With Respect to the Death of the late Emperour, by which it becomes a Question on the other Hand, whether it is not every way more Safe for *Europe*, Trade being secured to leave *Spain* in the Hands of King *Philip*, rather than join it undevied to the House of *Austria*, a Thing which was once so fatal to *Christendom* before.

This Alteration of the Face of Affairs in *Europe*, making it not altogether so needful. To insist upon the entire Evacuation of *Spain* to the House of *Austria*----- And that Article being the only Point, upon which the last Treaty was broken off: The Reason must be good, why that Treaty should now be Renewed, and why an End should be put to the War-----

The Advantages which might be farther Obtained by carrying on the War, seem all to be made Doubtful by this Article, since it remains Evident, those Advantages will all fall to the Share of the Emperour. Whereas it may no more be our real Advantage to procure Additions to the Emperour, than to *France*, as Things may Issue.

4. Because tho' *Britain* were supposed to be in a Condition to carry on the War, yet by Reason of the breaking out of a New and a Bloody War in the *North*, the Consequences of which, be they which Way they will, are like to be Fatal to the *Protestant Religion*, and the Confederacy. The Confederates and Allies concerned in this War, and by whose Assistance, we are Supplied with Troops for forming our Armies, are like to be so far Embroiled as to be rendred Unable to continue their Forces in our Service, and to yield us that Assistance which otherwise they would do, and without which it would be very Difficult for us to carry on the War.

This Respects the *Danes*, *Sweeds*, and *Saxons*, who having now brought the War into the very Heart of the Empire, it seems that which way soever it succeeds, it will affect us; if the *Sweeds* are reduced, the Guarrantee of the *Protestant* Interest in *Germany* is cut off; if the *Sweeds* prevail, the Empire is weakned, the *Danes* and *Saxons* ruin'd, and their Troops in our Armies recalled, and if that War is continued it is to be feared most of the
Protestant

Protestant Princes in the *Empire* will be Embark'd in it, so that the Confederacy will be greatly Weaken'd every way, and therefore as well to put our selves in a Posture to Influence and Arbitrate those Differences, and thereby to preserve the Protestant Interest in *Germany*, as also to prevent the Disadvantages to the Confederacy by that Rupture — It is high time, and this is a good Reason why we should put a speedy End to this War.

5. The Dreadful Prospect of an approaching Visitation from Heaven, which if it should touch any of those Countries now in Confederacy, while this War lasts, and the Contagion should from thence spread it self to the Armies on either side, must probably bring us to a Necessity of standing still and letting the Enemy Over-run us; or at least those who will venture farthest upon so Dreadful an Enemy as the Plague, will be most likely to carry on the War to their Advantage. But to us who are a Nation of Universal Commerce, it seems almost Unavoidable, and that it will be next to Impossible to prevent the Desolations that generally follow in such a Case.

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These are what we call Reasons why we ought to think of Peace, and why we should put a speedy End to this Expensive War ----- In this we do not find many Negatives among us, it is almost the Universal Cry among the Common People *God send us Peace*: When will these Wars be Over? What! shall we be always Fighting! and such Expressions as these. But the Dissatisfaction that seems to spread it self now among us at this time, respects the Conditions of the Peace; the Terms on which it shall be Concluded; in which Men speak as their own Judgment leadeth them; but some, and those too many, speak as their Unhappy Prejudices inspire them, either with Good or Evil Sentiments towards the Persons who are to Manage the Treaty.

Nothing hath been more the Subject of some People's Discourse relating to this Matter, Than the Destructive Conditions of this Peace: As if, because those who they desire to be employed therein are not likely to have any Hand in it; That therefore those who are Employed, will Betray and Give us up to the *French*, break in upon the Treaty of Alliance which we stand Engaged in, and Ruine the Confederacy. These are hard Sayings, and Ought to be very well Ground-
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ed, before we take up with them : For those People who speak Evil of others, ought to be well assured, that the Evil which they speak carries some Evidence with it, otherwise they incur the odious Name of Slanders to themselves.

This Remark is occasion'd by the Clamours of some People, who ever since the Suggestions of a Peace have spread any Breadths among us, have taken hold of that Report, to add what nothing but their own Prejudices could possibly make Rational to them, (*viz.*) That this Peace shall be Dishonourable; That it shall be a separate Treaty, without the Assent of our Allies--- That we shall give up *Spain* to the *French*, quit the Interests of King *Charles*, and make what they call an Unsafe Peace; as if it was a necessary Consequence, that because the Peace is not managed by the *Dutch*, therefore it must not be a Safe Peace; That we are not to be trusted with the Peace, though we have born the Burden of the War; and that *London* was not as fit a Place to treat with the *French* in, as *Gertruydenbergh*. We cannot be of this Mind in the least; and we must needs think, that since the Weight of the War has lain chiefly upon us, and Her Majesty is essentially the Head of the Confederacy, it as much belongs to us to treat of the Peace, as to the *Dutch*; and

it is all out as reasonable, that the *Dutch* should send their Ministers and Plenipotentiaries hither to meet the *French*, as it is that we should send our Plenipotentiaries thither --- Not to mention our Ministers standing still to hear and see with *Dutch* Ears and *Dutch* Eyes; and know nothing of the Treaty, but what the *Dutch* Deputies pleased to communicate.

We see no Necessity of this Consequence, That because we desire to have the Management of the Treaty, that therefore the *Dutch* are left out of it. Her Majesty has never yet done any thing but in Concert with Her Allies; and possibly the Allies may as readily consent to a Treaty at *London*, as a Treaty at the *Hague*. Why then should any Person be so chagrin at a Treaty at *London*? As if, because the *Dutch* do not manage the Treaty, they were to be left out of it. Nor do we find that the *Dutch* themselves are in the least manner jealous or uneasy at our Measures, though the Endeavours of some People, to make them so, may not have been wanting; but on the other hand, are, no doubt, by mutual Concert with our Court, sending over Two Plenipotentiaries, to be present here at any Conferences that may be held on this Occasion --- Where then the Grounds are for the Suspicions and Uneasinesses that are spread among us, upon this Appearance of

a Treaty, supposing it was true, we cannot see, unless some Advances were made, and some *Postulata* entred into, which were inconsistent with our Obligations to the Allies; if any such did really appear, the Allies themselves, the *Dutch* in an especial manner, whose Penetration is not the least Part of their Character, would take Umbrage at it immediately, and by Memorials and Representations, endeavour to put a Stop to such private Negotiations, that might be to their Prejudice. But the *Dutch* are a wiser People, than to amuse themselves with such Reports: And indeed how can they have any Pretence so to do, when, as there is an entire Confidence between Her Majesty and Her Allies, so no Measures in these Things are enter'd into on either hand, but by Concert and Agreement of all Parties, and to mutual Satisfaction: It seems very unaccountable, that our People here should make Objections at the Reality and Sincerity of the Treaty, when enter'd into, because of our being the more immediate Treater; or suggest, that we shall make meaner Concessions to the *French* than our Allies, since it does not at all appear, that our Confederates are made uneasy by the Advances yet made, which no Man will pretend to say are without the previous Concert and Agreement of our Allies.

The Reasons of re-assuming the Management of a Treaty into Her Majesty's Hands may be many, and the King of *France's* having resented the Treatment of his Ambassadors at *Gertruydenberg*, by the *Dutch*, may be One: Of which more might be said, if it were convenient; But it nowise can be infer'd, that because there may be less Resentment and Animosity on this Side, that therefore we must yield to dishonourable Conditions, and make a Peace upon worse Terms.

Nay though all the Conditions, which were insisted upon at *Gertruydenberg*, should not be now dwelt upon with the same Warmth, and the Stiffness and Vigour which some People acted with, which perhaps they might not now be well pleased with themselves, should be something abated, it may not follow that this may not be consistent with a Safe and Honourable Treaty, or that we may not act in it with a perfect Harmony and Agreement between Us and our Allies ---- So that we see nothing of any Ground for Jealousies and Uneasinesses among us; except that the Persons who object, will have it be, that *Britain* is not fit to be trusted with making the Conditions of her own Peace, without the Assistance of the *Dutch*, or rather without committing it

it to the *Dutch*, though at the same time they will allow *Britain* to bear the principal Burthen of the War: Nay, as if *Britain* was under the Tutelage of the *Dutch*, these People would have all the Articles of Peace concerted and determin'd by them; not intrusting us with any Share in them, as People not of age, and incapable of acting for our selves ----- What Impositions, what Severities, what Niceties, were the Occasion of the breaking off of the Last Treaty, they take upon them to justify; and make those things, which were even then accounted to be but as Circumstances of the Treaty, pass for Essential: As if no Method of Treating can be found out but that which was then enter'd upon, no Expedient for this or that Difficulty be voted safe for us, but just what was then thought of -- And that the *Dutch* were the Mint in which every Article of Peace must be coined, or else it could not be Current in the Confederacy; or that their Politicks were the Standard, by which every Step we took was to be tryed: This is making such an Idol of the *Dutch*, as the *Dutch* themselves do not desire, or can have any reason to expect.

If we take any step here prejudicial to the *Dutch*, as our Allies, or to any other of the Confederates, let the *Dutch* alone to complain

complain for themselves, there is no question but they will be forward enough to object; but it must have some other Signification, that we should have People here that should complain for the *Dutch*, before the *Dutch* complain for themselves, as if they did not understand their own Interest, or did not know what was doing among us, as well as those complaining People, who, we have some reason to believe, know little or nothing of the Matter neither.

But this is not all; these Party Politicians, not only charge us with the Manner of Treating (*viz.*) without the Concurrence of our Allies, but with the very Terms we are to conclude, and the Concessions we are to make to *France*, before any such Terms are treated upon, or such Concessions made, or perhaps thought upon, or intended to be made. Tho' this be an unreasonable and unjust Way of judging, yet seeing it is become Popular, and they run away with it as Fact, it may be useful to take them in their own Way, and giving their Pretences the full Latitude, inquire a little into the Fact; as if it were true, whether it be so or no, that such a Peace is determin'd to be made as they suggest. We need not run into many Particulars here; the Grand Supposition is, That the present Negotiations foot, tho' we do not grant that there
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are any Negotiations of any Kind whatever now on Foot, or treating of at all, or proposed in order to be treated of; but to grant the Question so begg'd by Common Fame (*viz.*) That we were to give up *Spain* to the *French*; which some Gentlemen have written of as a Thing so fatal, that it was all one with giving up *Britain*; and the *Review* has had the Modesty to say, That no Minister of State dares sign a Treaty of Peace for the Delivery of *Spain*. However, upon this Supposition let us expostulate a little with the *Review*, or his Party, upon the Point, at the same time protesting that there is not, to our Knowledge, any such Concession made, or designed to be made, or that *France* is under any Expectation of it.

But upon the Foot of this Protestation we may grant, for the Sake of the Argument only, that *Spain* was to be given up to the Possession of *Philip V.*

- Q. 1. Is there no Difference between *Spain* in the Possession of the present *Philip V.* and his Successours, (for he has Heirs) and *Spain* in the Possession of the K. of *France*?
2. Will not the Heirs of the present King *Philip* be as much *Spainards* in one Age more, as the Heirs of King *Lewis* will be *French*, and *vice versa*?
3. Will the Interests, either Politick or Trading, of *France* and *Spain* be ever capable of any Union?

4. Can no Treaty of Commerce be so stipulated between the Allies and King *Philip*, so as that our Trade may be kept free and secure, whether from Embargoes, Prohibitions, or Impositions, under the general Guarantees of the whole Confederacy?
5. Is *Spain* of any Consequence to us, but as our Trade to it is, or is not secured?
6. Is not *Spain*, in the Hands of K. *Philip*, with a considerable Possession freely given us in *Peru* and *Chili*, a Trade to the rest of *America*, and a Tariff of Trade to *Old Spain*, better for us than *Spain*, in the Hands of King *Charles*, entirely resign'd, without any of those Advantages?
7. Whether as to Power and the Ballance of *Europe*, may it not be as fatal, to have *Spain* and the *Indies*, i. e. The whole undivided Monarchy of *Spain* come to the House of *Austria*, and be annexed to the Empire, as to have Part of it only, in a Branch of the House of *Bourbon*, and that Branch not at all annex'd to the Kingdom of *France*?
8. Whether the Death of the late Emperour has not alter'd the Case, and chang'd the Face of *Europe*, so that a Partition of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was not reasonable, the E-
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States of the House of *Austria* being in Two Branches, is now become necessary, when they are all united in One?

9. Whether, had the Grand-Alliance been now to be made, it would not have been probable, that the Confederates would have stipulated, that the Crown of *Spain* should no more be in the Person of the Emperour, than of the King of *France*?

10. Whether, so many Expedients offering themselves in this Case, it may be worth all the Blood that may yet be expended, before *France* can be compelled to yield up the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, and King *Philip* be driven entirely out of it; and whether a reasonable Partition be not better than such a Conquest?

11. Whether we are sure that we shall ever be able to compleat the Conquest of it, and force them to the Evacuation we pretend to; and if not, whether the Partition may not at last be made upon worse Terms then, that it may now?

These Queries are capable of great Enlargements; and much may be said to every Head --- But as these Sheets can by no means contain the Full of the Argument, it is proposed rather by Way of Query, in
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which the Judicious Reader will see the following Things. 1. That there does not seem the same Reasons now, which were good Reasons then for resolving to make no Peace, till the whole undivided Monarchy of *Spain* shall be restored to the House of *Austria*. This Difference arising from the Death of the late Emperour *Joseph*, by which Means an exorbitant Power and Greatness will accrue to King *Charles*, who is now likely to be chosen Emperour; and in the Nature of the Grand-Alliance ought not also to enjoy the whole *Spanish* Dominions both in *Europe* and *America*, which would be a Power far too great for the rest of *Europe*, and as *K. William* said, (when Prince of *Orange*) would give us Reason to be as much *Frenchmen* as we are now *Spaniards*. Vide *Sir Wm. Temple's Memoirs*. P. 82.

Seeing then that the Circumstances of Things are alter'd, the same Necessities, and the same Conveniencies, do not subsist as Inferences. 2. Here also we may observe the same destructive Prospect of our Commerce does not appear, under an Expedient never before thought of, (*viz.*) Of putting the Queen of *Great-Britain* in Possession of a Part of the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*, to wit, In the Kingdoms of *Chili* and *Peru*, with a Tariff of Trade Secured to Us in both *Old Spain* and *New*. These Things de-

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stroy the Necessity that has all along been upon us to reduce *Old-Spain* into the Obedience of the House of *Austria*; which was made necessary as to *Britain*, meerly for the Security of our Commerce, the Export and Consumption of our Manufactures, and the Employment of our Poor; all which will be effectually provided by entirely putting into our Hands such a Branch of Trade, as is much more than equivalent to all the Trade we can expect to lose, by *France* breaking in upon our *Spanish* Trade. So that, leaving *Spain* now in the Hands of *Philip V.* is not altogether so Fatal a Thing, as some have suggested, or as it appear'd to be before the Death of the late Emperor.

Upon the Whole, the Author of this believing, that every one will grant a Partition of the *Spanish* Monarchy, appears much more reasonable than ever it did before, and the only Medium or Expedient to put an End to the Calamities of *Europe*, humbly offers Two Schemes, in which Matters stand so fairly, and so equally divided, that if it stands as an Alternative to either Side, it may perhaps be a Difficulty to either Party which Part to take, and which Part to refuse, and the Advantage be so little on either Side, as that *Europe* it self cannot

find Reason to complain in general of any unjust Breach upon the Ballance of Power, so as to enslave one Side to the other.

Here follow,

Two several Schemes of a Partition of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which may either Way be the Ground of a safe and lasting Peace in *Europe*, and in which Division the Exorbitant Power of either the House of *Bourbon*, or the House of *Austria*, are provided against.

The First Partition.

1. **T**HAT *Spain* and the *Indies* be given to King *Charles* entire, although; he should be Chosen Emperour of *Germany*.
2. But that to prevent the Exorbitant Greatness of the House of *Austria*, and effectually to separate the Empire from the said Kingdom of *Spain*, or the Emperor from receiving Assistance reciprocally from either Part; The *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy*, and the Mediterranean be given to King *Philip*, (*viz.*) The Kingdoms of *Naples*, *Sicily*,

cily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the other Islands, with the Spanish Towns in Tuscany, and the Dutchy of Milan.

3. That to prevent the Exorbitant Power, either of the Empire, or of *France*, the *Spanish* Dominions in the Low Countries, be given in Sovereignty to the States of *Holland*, or be put into their Hands by way of Sequestration, as a Barrier against *France*, to acknowledge the King of *Spain*, but the Governour to be appointed by the States of *Holland*.

4. The Islands of *Canaries* to be Delivered to the *English*, and according to the Sixth Article of the Grand Alliance, whatever they have Seized upon, or may Seize upon in *America*, before the Peace is Sign'd.

5. The Island of and Port of *Mahon* to be possessed by the *English*, to preserve their Trade in the *Mediterranean*, and secure a Retreat for their Fleet, and for their Merchants.

A Second Partition.

*Being an Alternative to the
Former.*

1. **T**hat *Spain* and the *Indies*, remain to King *Philip V.*
2. That all the rest of the *Spanish* Dominions as well Islands on the *Mediterranean* as Possessions on the *Continent*, (*viz*) *Naples*, *Milan*, and Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, except the Island of and Port of *Mahone*, shall be given to King *Charles* and his Successors.
3. The *Spanish* Dominions in the *Netherlands*, to be given to the States of *Holland*, as before, for an Effectual Barrier against *France*.
4. Quiet Possession to be given to the Queen of *Great Britain*, of Four Ports, such as shall be named in the Kingdoms of *Chili* and *Peru*, with sufficient Extent of the Country round, and a Freedom of Commerce to

to all the *Spanish* Dominions, South of the Equinox on the Western Coast of *America*.

5. The Islands of the *Canaries*, the Island of *Hispaniola*, and the Island of *Majorca*, and Port of *Mahone*, to be given to the *English*.
6. A Tariff of Trade to be settled, by which the *English* and *Dutch* shall be allowed a Free Trade to and from *Old Spain*, and to import to, and export from *Spain*, the Goods, Growth, and Manufactures of the respective Countries, without being subject to any other Impositions or Prohibitions than in the Year 1700. And that if any Abatement of Customs in the Ports of *Spain*, shall be made to the Subjects of *France* or *Italy*, the same Abatement of Customs to be made to the Subjects of *Britain* and *Holland*.

We believe it may be difficult for any Private Person to determine which of these Schemes are most for the Good of *Europe*, or of these Islands in especial Manner ——— From whence we draw this brief Inference, as a Conclusion to this Work.

That without tying our selves down to the Humour and Caprice of any of

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the Treaty of Alliance is required; if En-
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